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Opioid Multidistrict Litigation Secrecy 
JENNIFER D. OLIVA 
“I don’t think anyone in the country is interested in a whole lot of finger-
pointing at this point, and I’m not either. People aren’t interested in 
depositions, and discovery, and trials.”1 
 
“Although it has many purposes and goals, litigation is a fact-finding 
device designed as a search for the truth.”2 
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 1 Transcript of Proceedings at 4, In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., MDL No. 2804 
(N.D. Ohio Jan. 9, 2018), ECF No. 58 [hereinafter Transcript of Jan. 9, 2018 Hearing] 
(statement of United States District Court Judge Dan Aaron Polster). 
 2 In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 235 F.R.D. 334, 346 (E.D. La. 2006). 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Considerable attention has been devoted to the massive opioid multidistrict 
litigation (MDL), which consists of nearly 2000 federal court cases consolidated 
in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio before Judge 
Dan Aaron Polster.3 Journalists have examined whether the plaintiff counties, 
municipalities, and tribes have pleaded viable causes of action against the 
defendant manufacturers, distributors, and chain pharmacies that stand accused 
of exacerbating the opioid crisis by misbranding, aggressively marketing, and 
failing to monitor, flag, and report suspicious shipments of prescription opioid 
pills.4 Pundits have speculated as to the scope of potential damages in play given 
that experts estimate that the crisis has cost the United States at least $1 trillion 
since 2001 and will cost an additional $500 billion through 2020 unless the 
country pursues strategies that curb the crisis.5 And the media has 
enthusiastically covered the nefarious allegations that have been levelled at the 
opioid crisis’s most notorious villains: the wealthy Sacklers of Purdue Pharma 
fame6—who have removed themselves from the opioid MDL in an attempt to 
shield their immense family fortune from liability by filing for bankruptcy 
protection.7  
Until recently, however, scant attention has been consigned to the opioid 
MDL’s most salient and, arguably, most disturbing feature: its insidious 
secrecy.8 The clandestine nature of the MDL has prevented the public from 
 
 3 Benjamin Lesser et al., How Judges Added to the Grim Toll of Opioids, REUTERS 
(June 25, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/usa-courts-
secrecy-judges/ [https://perma.cc/63V2-W9N2]. 
 4 Robert VerBruggen, Who’s to Blame for Opioid Abuse?, NAT’L REV. (June 8, 2017), 
https://www.nationalreview.com/2017/06/opioid-lawsuits-long-odds-tricky-legal-
arguments/ [https://perma.cc/EH95-UXTB]. 
 5 Dan Mangan, Economic Cost of the Opioid Crisis: $1 Trillion and Growing Faster, 
CNBC (Feb. 13, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/02/12/economic-cost-of-the-
opioid-crisis-1-trillion-and-growing-faster.html [https://perma.cc/X4AK-9KQY]; see 
also Alison Frankel, Expert Witness in Opioids MDL: Fixing Crisis Will Cost $483 Billion, 
REUTERS (Apr. 18, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-otc-opioids-idUSKCN1 
RU2I5 [https://perma.cc/427P-4FA8] (citing an expert witness in the opioid MDL who 
estimated the cost of addressing the crisis to be near $480 billion). 
 6 See, e.g., Danny Hakim et al., Lawsuits Lay Bare Sackler Family’s Role in Opioid 
Crisis, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 1, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/01/health/sacklers 
-oxycontin-lawsuits.html [https://perma.cc/4APF-VUMX]. 
 7 See Renae Merle & Lenny Bernstein, Purdue Pharma’s Bankruptcy Plan Includes 
Special Protection for the Sackler Family Fortune, WASH. POST (Sept. 18, 2019), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2019/09/18/purdue -pharmas-bankruptcy-
plan-includes-special-protection-sackler-family-fortune/ [https://perma.cc/23V3-J5S9]. 
 8 Daniel Fisher, Judge Sees Litigation as Only an ‘Aid in Settlement Discussions’ for 
Opioid Lawsuits, FORBES (May 10, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/legalnewsline/ 
2018/05/10/judge-sees-litigation-as-only-an-aid-in-settlement-discussions-for-opioid 
-lawsuits/#6e5a09844b99 [https://perma.cc/4EJ8-D7XG] (explaining that opioid MDL 
2019] OPIOID MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION SECRECY 665 
understanding the plaintiffs’ allegations and legal arguments, the basic facts 
concerning the scope of corporate marketing, distribution, and sale of 
prescription opioids, and the DEA’s confounding failure to detect suspicious 
sales of the drugs and, thereby, mitigate diversion.9 This Article examines the 
events that instigated the opioid MDL’s secrecy, discusses the legal merits of 
the district court’s nondisclosure rulings in the mass tort public health litigation, 
analyzes the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit’s decision 
vacating and remanding the district court’s nondisclosure rulings, discusses the 
district court’s disclosure-related decisions on remand, and, ultimately, 
contends that a trial court’s failure to make crucial evidence transparent in 
aggregate national health emergency lawsuits, like the opioid MDL, is likely to 
undermine the public health promoting outcomes such litigation aims to 
achieve. 
II. DEA ARCOS DATABASE  
The opioid MDL’s pervasive secrecy stems from the public entity plaintiffs’ 
request for discovery of critical prescription opioid transaction data contained 
in the federal Drug Enforcement Administration’s (DEA) Automation of 
Reports and Consolidated Orders System (ARCOS) database. The 1970 
Controlled Substances Act (CSA) devised a closed chain of controlled 
substances distribution specifically designed to prevent the diversion of legal 
products into the illicit market.10 That system requires CSA Schedule II and III 
opioid manufacturers and distributors to submit reports detailing “every sale, 
delivery or other disposal” of prescription opioids to the DEA.11 These 
manufacturer and distributor opioid transaction disclosures are uploaded to the 
ARCOS database, which summarizes them into reports that can be used to 
identify suspicious orders and the potential diversion of prescription opioids.12  
ARCOS, therefore, is “an automated, comprehensive drug reporting system 
which monitors the flow of DEA controlled substances from their point of 
 
Judge “Polster has sworn both sides to secrecy and many documents remain sealed, including 
the complaints”). 
 9 See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REVIEW OF THE 
DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION’S REGULATORY AND ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS TO 
CONTROL THE DIVERSION OF OPIOIDS 13 (Sept. 2019), https://oig.justice.gov/reports/ 
2019/a1905.pdf [https://perma.cc/LH8C-HTRK] [hereinafter DOJ IG DEA OPIOIDS 
REPORT]; Lenny Bernstein, DEA Allowed Huge Growth in Painkiller Supply as Overdose 




 10 Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 801–971 (2012). 
 11 Id. § 827(d)(1). 
 12 See, e.g., DIVERSION CONTROL DIV., DRUG ENF’T ADMIN., 2017 RETAIL DRUG 
SUMMARY REPORT (July 2018), https://www.deadiversion.usdoj.gov/arcos/retail_drug 
_summary/report_yr_2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/H4YK-WBM8]. 
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manufacture through commercial distribution channels to point of sale or 
distribution at the dispensing/retail level.”13 ARCOS data includes the following 
information for each CSA-regulated drug transaction: supplier’s name, DEA 
registration number, address, and business activity; buyer’s name, DEA 
registration number, and address; prescription drug code, transaction date, total 
dosage units, and total grams.14 The CSA also imposes specific duties upon 
wholesale distributors to monitor, identify, halt, and report “suspicious orders” 
of prescription opioids.15 
III. MDL ARCOS PROCEEDINGS: PRODUCTION TO PUBLIC ENTITY 
PLAINTIFFS 
The battle for access to the DEA’s ARCOS opioid data was set in motion 
prior to the opioid MDL’s existence. During an October 24, 2017 status 
conference involving nineteen opioid cases before the United States District 
Court for the Southern District of Ohio, the plaintiff Ohio counties and 
municipalities sought the court’s permission to subpoena the DEA to obtain 
pertinent opioid transaction information stored in the ARCOS database.16 The 
district court granted that request but stayed discovery pending the United States 
Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation’s (JPML) ruling on motions to create 
an opioid MDL.17  
The DEA promptly raised a dozen objections to the Ohio plaintiffs’ ARCOS 
subpoena.18 The agency’s opposition to the data request relied primarily on a 
pair of troublesome contentions. First, the DEA claimed that production of 
historical ARCOS data “would reveal investigatory records compiled for law 
enforcement purposes, and [as such] interfere with [its Controlled Substances 
Act] enforcement proceedings.”19 It further maintained that ARCOS disclosure 
would improperly reveal opioid manufacturer and distributor trade secrets and 
confidential business information and, consequently, cause those entities 
substantial competitive harm.20 In other words, the DEA—a federal agency 
created by Congress to monitor and improve controlled substance-related public 
health outcomes—injected itself into the opioid litigation not to assist the public 
 
 13 Declaration of John J. Martin in Support of the United States of America’s Brief 
Posing Objections to Disclosure of ARCOS Data ¶ 6, In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., 
MDL No. 2804 (N.D. Ohio June 26, 2018), ECF No. 663-1. 
 14 Id. at ¶ 7. 
 15 21 C.F.R. § 1301.74 (2016). 
 16 Pretrial Order No. 2 at 3–4, City of Cincinnati v. AmerisourceBergen Drug Corp., 
No. 2:17-cv-713 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 30, 2017), ECF No. 75. 
 17 Id. at 3. 
 18 Objections of the U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Drug Enforcement Admin. to Plaintiff’s 
Subpoena at 3–9, AmerisourceBergen Drug Corp., No. 2:17-cv-713, ECF No. 101.  
 19 Id. at 5. 
 20 Id. at 6. 
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entity plaintiffs but to advance the alleged privacy interests of the defendant 
pharmaceutical corporations that it is charged with regulating. 
If a September 2019 Department of Justice (DOJ) Inspector General (IG) 
Report is any guide, the DEA also was motivated to intervene in the litigation 
to keep secret from the public its own massive failure to regulate the supply and 
distribution of prescription opioids.21 The DOJ IG Report levelled several 
damning accusations at the DEA, finding that the agency “was slow to respond 
to the significant increase in the use and diversion of opioids since 2000.”22 The 
Report further found that “DEA did not use its available resources, including its 
data systems and strongest administrative enforcement tools, to detect and 
regulate diversion effectively,” and “DEA policies and regulations did not 
adequately hold registrants accountable or prevent the diversion of 
pharmaceutical opioids.”23 
It is hardly any surprise, then, that the DEA robustly objected to any 
disclosure of its ARCOS data. In support of its data nondisclosure posture, the 
DEA pointed to the federal Privacy Act24 and Touhy regulations,25 which 
enumerate the factors that the agency must consider in response to requests for 
production of information.26 The Touhy regulations, however, do not require the 
DEA to withhold data even where, unlike the ARCOS information, it 
indisputably contains investigatory records or trade secrets. Instead, they 
expressly permit the DEA to produce such information so long as disclosure is 
required by the “administration of justice.”27 In determining whether an 
information request satisfies the “administration of justice” standard, the Touhy 
regulations mandate that the DEA consider, among other things, “[t]he 
seriousness of the violation . . . involved,” “[t]he past history . . . of the 
violator,” “[t]he importance of the relief sought,” and “[t]he importance of the 
legal issues presented.”28  
The plaintiffs’ ARCOS opioid transaction data requests appear to satisfy the 
administration of justice criteria. The nation’s drug use and overdose crisis has 
claimed hundreds of thousands of lives and, as previously noted, cost American 
taxpayers approximately a trillion dollars since 2001.29 And numerous of the 
 
 21 See DOJ IG DEA OPIOIDS REPORT, supra note 9, at 13–27. 
 22 Id. at i. 
 23 Id. 
 24 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2012). 
 25 28 C.F.R. § 16.26 (2018). The Touhy regulations derive their name from United 
States ex rel. Touhy v. Ragen, in which the Supreme Court held that the head of a federal 
agency may determine on their sole authority whether to produce documents in response to 
a subpoena. 340 U.S. 462, 470 (1951). 
 26 Objections of the U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Drug Enforcement Admin. to Plaintiff’s 
Subpoena, supra note 18, at 5 (“DEA objects to the production of the requested information 
under DOJ’s [Touhy] regulations because it would violate the Privacy Act.” (citations 
omitted)). 
 27 Id. § 16.26(c). 
 28 Id. § 16.26(c)(1)–(4). 
 29 Mangan, supra note 5. 
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MDL defendants’ pertinent “past history” is atrocious. The federal government 
has extracted hundreds of millions of dollars in fines and penalties from the 
opioid manufacturers and distributors as a result of their unlawful market-
related behavior, and it has even criminally indicted certain defendants due to 
their opioid-related conduct.30 The DEA’s disclosure objections, however, 
made no mention of either the administration of justice rule or its factors, let 
alone contended that the rule was inapplicable to the plaintiffs’ ARCOS data 
request.31 
The DEA also ignored relevant and dispositive provisions of the federal 
Privacy Act that compromised its objections to ARCOS data production. 
Because the Privacy Act expressly exempts from its purview court-ordered 
discovery, it is legally impossible for data released pursuant to a district court 
order to violate the statute.32 And even if that was not the case, the Privacy Act 
permits the disclosure of agency records to any person upon “a showing of 
compelling circumstances affecting the health or safety of an individual.”33 
Given that the plaintiffs have alleged that the defendants’ prescription opioid 
branding, distribution, and marketing behavior collectively and proximately 
caused a national health emergency resulting in the deaths of hundreds of 
thousands of people, the ARCOS data request arguably satisfies the Privacy 
Act’s health and safety exception.34 
Before the district court had an opportunity to rule on the DEA’s objections 
to the ARCOS subpoena, however, the JPML consolidated the sixty-four opioid 
cases then-pending across the federal districts and transferred them to the United 
States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio for pre-trial 
proceedings.35 Judge Dan Polster thereby inherited the ARCOS opioid data 
production feud.36 He entered into the fray by ordering the plaintiffs and DEA 
to attempt to reach a consensus regarding ARCOS data production.37 In so 
doing, the judge pointed to the DEA’s admission that it was willing “to continue 
discussions with plaintiffs concerning the disclosure of ARCOS data consistent 
with disclosures it has made to other requestors, e.g., state and local government 
 
 30 See Barry Meier, In Guilty Plea, OxyContin Maker to Pay $600 Million, N.Y. TIMES 
(May 10, 2007), https://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/10/business/11drug-web.html 
[https://perma.cc/D2VX-R8R3]. 
 31 See Objections of the U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Drug Enforcement Admin. to Plaintiff’s 
Subpoena, supra note 18, at 3–9. 
 32 See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(11) (2012). 
 33 Id. § 552a(b)(8). 
 34 See Re: Touhy Request for ARCOS/DADS Database Production at 4, City of 
Cincinnati v. AmerisourceBergen Drug Corp., No. 2:17-cv-713 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 31, 2017), 
ECF No. 81-1 (alleging the defendant drug corporations’ involvement in the opioid 
epidemic); Transfer Order at 3, In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., MDL No. 2804 
(J.P.M.L. Dec. 12, 2017), ECF No. 1 (stating the common allegations upon consolidation). 
 35 Transfer Order, supra note 34, at 1. 
 36 Id. at 4. 
 37 Order Re: ARCOS/DADS Database at 2, In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., MDL 
No. 2804 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 2, 2018), ECF No. 112. 
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entities.”38 In other words, the DEA conceded that it had previously disclosed 
ARCOS data to public entities, including local governments, much like the 
opioid MDL plaintiffs. 
After much back and forth, the DEA and MDL plaintiffs remained unable 
to resolve their differences. The plaintiffs sought data for each opioid 
transaction stored in the ARCOS database from January 1, 2006 through 
January 15, 2015, including the date of the transaction; the seller’s name, DEA 
registrant number, business activity, state, and transaction code; the buyer’s 
name, DEA registrant number, business activity, county, state, and zip code; and 
the drug code, manufacturer, dosage units, grams-weight, and quantity.39 The 
DEA, on the other hand, would only agree to produce limited, de-identified 
opioid data devoid of any transactional information that would enable the 
plaintiffs to ascertain “(a) which manufacturers (b) sold what types of pills (c) 
to which distributors” or “(d) which distributors (e) sold what types of pills (f) 
to which retailers (g) in what locations.”40 
Judge Polster held a February 26, 2018 hearing in a final push to nudge the 
public entity plaintiffs and DEA toward a mutually acceptable resolution to the 
ARCOS data production dispute.41 When that effort proved futile, the judge 
made two important decisions. First, he put in place a protective order applicable 
to all ARCOS data.42 Second, he issued an opinion, which determined the scope 
of ARCOS data that the court required the DEA to produce to the public entity 
plaintiffs.43  
The district court’s ARCOS data protective order was sweeping. It 
demanded that any disclosed ARCOS information remain confidential, limited 
the use of that data to litigation and law enforcement purposes, and required the 
redaction or sealing of all court-filed documents, including pleadings, inclusive 
of such data.44 The protective order also commanded the public entity plaintiffs 
to notify the DEA and MDL defendants immediately upon their receipt of any 
public records request for ARCOS data and, in a move to cement ARCOS data-
related secrecy into perpetuity, ordered the public entity plaintiffs to either 
destroy or return to the DEA all ARCOS information produced during the 
litigation at the conclusion of those proceedings.45  
 
 38 Id. at 1–2 (quoting Objections of the U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Drug Enforcement Admin. 
to Plaintiff’s Subpoena, supra note 18, at 9). 
 39 Order Regarding ARCOS Data at 4, In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., MDL No. 
2804 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 11, 2018), ECF No. 233. 
 40 Id. at 6. 
 41 See Transcript of Proceedings at 5, In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., MDL No. 
2804 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 1, 2018), ECF No. 156 [hereinafter Transcript of Feb. 26, 2018 
Hearing]. 
 42 Protective Order Re: DEA’s ARCOS/DADS Database at 1, In re Nat’l Prescription 
Opiate Litig., MDL No. 2804 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 6, 2018), ECF No. 167. 
 43 Order Regarding ARCOS Data, supra note 39, at 22. 
 44 Protective Order Re: DEA’s ARCOS/DADS Database, supra note 42, at 1–4. 
 45 Id. at 6–7. 
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The ARCOS data protective order, however, appears unlawful on its face. 
A federal court’s issuance of a protective order “is circumscribed by a long-
established legal tradition which values public access to court proceedings.”46 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (FRCP) 26(c) proscribes a federal court from 
granting a protective order unless the party that seeks protection—here, the 
DEA—establishes good cause.47 This means that, in order to be entitled to a 
protective order, the moving party is required to demonstrate with particularity 
and specificity that harm or prejudice will result if the protective order is not 
granted. Speculative and conclusory statements do not constitute good cause.48 
Moreover, federal courts are not required to issue protective orders even where 
the party seeking protection demonstrates sufficient harm. Instead, upon such a 
showing of harm, the court is required to balance the public’s interest in 
disclosure against the protection-seeking party’s interest in secrecy.49  
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure make no exceptions where, as here, 
the parties stipulate to a proposed protective order or agree to certain of its 
terms.50 The district court’s ARCOS protective order, however, makes no 
reference whatsoever to good cause. And it is entirely bereft of any findings or 
conclusions that could be fairly characterized as either a good cause analysis or 
a balancing of the respective interests at stake.51 The ARCOS data protective 
order, therefore, failed to comport with federal law. 
In addition to issuing an overly broad and legally suspect protective order, 
the district court rejected the plaintiffs’ request for opioid transaction-specific 
information and limited the DEA’s production burden to the narrow subset of 
de-identified ARCOS data that the agency was willing to share.52 Specifically, 
the court ordered the DEA to  
(a) provide Excel spreadsheets to Plaintiffs that (b) identified the top 
manufacturers and distributors who sold 95% of the prescription opiates (c) to 
each State (d) during the time period of January 1, 2006 through December 31, 
2014 (e) on a year-by-year and State-by-State basis, along with (f) the 
 
 46 Procter & Gamble Co. v. Bankers Tr. Co., 78 F.3d 219, 227 (6th Cir. 1996) (internal 
quotations omitted).  
 47 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(1). 
 48 Nemir v. Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 381 F.3d 540, 550 (6th Cir. 2004) (quoting Gulf 
Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 89, 102 n.16 (1981) (“[A] protective order [is authorized] only 
under circumstances ‘which justice requires to protect a party or person from annoyance, 
embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense,’ the potential for which must be 
illustrated with ‘a particular and specific demonstration of fact, as distinguished from 
stereotyped and conclusory statements.’”). 
 49 MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 11.432 at 67 (2004) (“In assessing 
[protective order] requests, courts balance the potential harm to the party seeking protection 
against the requesting party’s need for the information and the public interest served by its 
release.”). 
 50 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c). 
 51 See Protective Order Re: DEA’s ARCOS/DADS Database, supra note 42, at 1–2. 
 52 Order Regarding ARCOS Data, supra note 39, at 5–6. 
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aggregate amount of pills sold and (g) the market shares of each manufacturer 
and distributor.53 
The district court, therefore, adopted the DEA’s data production proposal in 
toto. 
Judge Polster, however, abruptly reversed course just five weeks later by 
overruling his own ARCOS data disclosure decision. In a written opinion, he 
concluded that the DEA had failed to satisfy its burden of demonstrating good 
cause to withhold the transaction-specific ARCOS data requested by plaintiffs 
under FRCP 45(d), which controls third-party subpoenas.54 Judge Polster 
characterized the DEA’s law enforcement interests and the defendants’ trade 
secret objections as speculative and conclusory and ordered the DEA to produce 
the opioid transaction information to the plaintiffs subject to the ARCOS 
protective order.55 Several issues salient to the court’s change-of-heart 
regarding the scope of ARCOS data that was subject to disclosure warrant 
emphasis. 
First, the ARCOS opioid transaction information sought by the plaintiffs 
constitutes evidence central to proving or refuting their allegations that the 
defendants deliberately overflooded plaintiffs’ respective jurisdictions, e.g., 
counties, cities, towns, municipalities, and tribal nations with prescription 
opioids. ARCOS data identifying precisely how many and which type of pills 
each opioid manufacturer and distributor delivered to each retail pharmacy on 
specific dates would—and, ultimately, did—enable the plaintiffs to determine 
which entities they should name as defendants, permit the litigation “to proceed 
based on meaningful, objective data, not conjecture or speculation,” and 
“provid[e] invaluable, highly specific information regarding historic patterns of 
opioid sales.”56 As Judge Polster explained:  
There is overwhelming need for the Plaintiffs in this case to learn the truth 
surrounding marketing and distribution of opioids, including what the 
manufacturers, distributors, retailers, and DEA knew and when they knew it; 
what, if anything, was kept, intentionally or unintentionally, away from the 
DEA and the public by defendants; and what, if anything, the DEA kept, 
intentionally or unintentionally, from the States, counties, and cities that have 
filed the MDL lawsuits.57 
In other words, it was impossible for the public entity plaintiffs to glean “the 
extent to which each defendant and potential defendant engaged in the allegedly 
 
 53 Id. at 6. 
 54 Id. at 19; see FED. R. CIV. P. 45(d). 
 55 Order Regarding ARCOS Data, supra note 39, at 16–17, 19. 
 56 Second Order Regarding ARCOS Data at 2, In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., 
MDL No. 2804 (N.D. Ohio May 8, 2018), ECF No. 397. 
 57 Order Regarding ARCOS Data, supra note 39, at 21. 
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fraudulent marketing of opioids, filling of suspicious orders, and diversion of 
drugs” without the ARCOS opioid transaction data.58 
Second, the DEA’s ARCOS database does not comprise any law 
enforcement investigatory information or corporate trade secrets. ARCOS 
simply stores business-generated controlled substance transaction reports, 
including prescription opioid transaction reports, compiled and produced by 
controlled substance manufacturers and distributors.59 ARCOS does not contain 
any law enforcement analysis or work-product or confidential business 
information or trade secrets, such as pill formulations.60 Judge Polster did not 
mince words on this latter point, stating: “Where the pills went is not a trade 
secret.”61 He was even less enthralled by the pharmaceutical defendants’ 
confidential business information argument, retorting that “market data over 
three years old carried no risk of competitive harm,”62 and, in any event, “there 
shouldn’t be a lot of competition for distributing opioids.”63 
Third, the DEA’s contention that the disclosure of historic ARCOS opioid 
transaction data would interfere with law enforcement interests is undermined 
by the staleness of the information requested, which was limited to the time 
period 2006–2014.64 The DEA is bound by the CSA’s five-year statute of 
limitations applicable to the prosecution of controlled substance offenses.65 
Consequently, the agency was unable to convince Judge Polster, a former 
federal prosecutor, that it had any viable enforcement interests in historic 
ARCOS data.66 As the judge acknowledged, “[W]hatever was going on in 2010, 
’11, ’12, ’13, . . . there’s no law enforcement objective there now; that’s historic, 
but it’s important for this litigation.”67 Bolstering that observation is a recently 
decided Minnesota federal district court opinion, which held that the release of 
at least five-year-old, company-specific ARCOS opioid transaction data carried 
little risk of competitive harm in a case involving a similar opioid information 
production dispute between the DEA and a plaintiff.68  
Finally, the MDL court’s ARCOS opioid transaction data production order 
articulates a questionable rationale to justify its refusal to compel the DEA to 
produce that very same information to the plaintiffs when they initially 
requested it much earlier in the litigation. The order concedes that the “[d]etailed 
 
 58 Id. at 15. 
 59 See supra Part II. 
 60 Transcript of Feb. 26, 2018 Hearing, supra note 41, at 25 (“[T]his is simply DEA’s 
data because it’s been received by the government, but there’s absolutely nothing whatsoever 
that’s been generated by any government office or agent or employee.”).  
 61 Id. at 15. 
 62 Order Regarding ARCOS Data, supra note 39, at 17 (emphasis added). 
 63 Transcript of Feb. 26, 2018 Hearing, supra note 41, at 52. 
 64 Order Regarding ARCOS Data, supra note 39, at 1. 
 65 18 U.S.C. § 3282(a) (2012). 
 66 See Transcript of Feb. 26, 2018 Hearing, supra note 41, at 14. 
 67 Id. 
 68 Madel v. United States, No. 13-2832, 2017 WL 111302, at *2 (D. Minn. Jan. 11, 
2017). 
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ARCOS data evidence [the plaintiffs demand] is relevant . . . to prove 
culpability [and] . . . for purposes of allocation of settlement funds.”69 It 
nonetheless goes on to explain that the court had initially sided with the DEA 
because the much more limited ARCOS data that the agency had agreed to 
produce was “sufficient to address the Court’s immediate focus on ‘forward-
looking initiatives and actions to help ameliorate the opioid crisis.’”70 By 
“forward-looking initiatives and actions,” the court was referring to its unbridled 
enthusiasm for a rapid, global settlement devoid of protracted discovery or trials 
that might reveal to the public information that could either bolster or undermine 
the plaintiffs’ allegations against the defendants and, thereby, permit the public 
to critically assess any proposed settlement agreement between the parties.  
Since the opioid MDL’s inception, Judge Polster has made it clear that his 
singular objective is to ensure that the parties settle the aggregate litigation pre-
trial.71 At first blush, that goal seems unremarkable. The overwhelming majority 
of civil cases either settle or are dismissed pre-trial.72 Judge Polster, however, 
went to extraordinary lengths to try to corral a quick deal to resolve the 
aggregated federal opioid cases pre-trial and, thereby, avoid robust discovery 
and public trials.73  
For example, during his very first gathering of the MDL parties, which he 
characterized as a “settlement conference,” Judge Polster compelled the entities 
on both sides of the litigation to engage in settlement negotiations.74 He also 
made public his preference that the parties reach a “rapid settlement rather than 
trying cases” and engaging in vigorous discovery so that communities across 
the country devastated by opioid use disorder and overdoses could receive funds 
to fight the crisis.75 And the judge was entirely transparent about his intentions 
during a January 9, 2018 public hearing, during which he said: “I don’t think 
anyone in the country is interested in a whole lot of finger-pointing, and I’m not 
either. People aren’t interested in depositions, and discovery, and trials.”76 He 
went on to declare: “[W]e don’t need a lot of briefs and we don’t need 
 
 69 Order Regarding ARCOS Data, supra note 39, at 15 n.8. 
 70 Id. 
 71 Fisher, supra note 8. 
 72 See generally Theodore Eisenberg & Charlotte Lanvers, What is the Settlement Rate 
and Why Should We Care?, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 111 (2009) (discussing the 
importance of gathering and analyzing data on settlement rates and the variability in 
settlement rates based on the type of case). 
 73 Howard M. Erichson, MDL and the Allure of Sidestepping Litigation, 53 GA. L. REV. 
1287, 1289 (2019) (explaining that Judge Polster “took an unusually aggressive pro-
settlement stance from the start”). 
 74 See Minutes of 1-31-18 Settlement Conference and Scheduling Order at 1, In re Nat’l 
Prescription Opiate Litig., MDL No. 2804 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 2, 2018), ECF No. 111. 
 75 Jan Hoffman, Can This Judge Solve the Opioid Crisis?, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 5, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/05/health/opioid-crisis-judge-lawsuits.html [https 
://perma.cc/K83J-FZWJ]. 
 76 Transcript of Jan. 9, 2018 Hearing, supra note 1, at 4. 
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trials. . . . [N]one of them are . . . going to solve what we’ve got.”77 Professor 
Howard Erichson has characterized these remarks as “stunning statement[s] 
from a judge.”78 As the complex litigation expert aptly observed:  
It is one thing for a judge to say that abatement of the crisis is an important 
goal, that the federal MDL has a role to play in achieving this goal, that the 
judge intends to manage the litigation in a way that furthers this goal wherever 
possible, and that ultimately a negotiated resolution may be the best way to 
achieve this goal. It is quite another thing to forswear litigation and 
adjudication altogether.79  
As already noted, Judge Polster expressly defended his initial refusal to 
grant the plaintiffs access to the opioid transaction data—in violation of, among 
other things, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure—on the grounds that “only 
circumscribed information within the ARCOS database is necessary to facilitate 
settlement.”80 Forbes went so far as to publish an article about Judge Polster’s 
management of the opioid MDL entitled Judge Sees Litigation as Only an “Aid 
in Settlement Discussions” for Opioid Lawsuits.81 That report describes Judge 
Polster as “peeved” that he was pressured to manage an MDL “litigation track” 
and schedule bellwether trials, which he described as “necessary to do” 
“but . . . not a substitute or replacement [for settlement] in any way.”82 
Judge Polster reiterated his aggressive pro-settlement, anti-litigation stance 
during an August 2, 2018 hearing, during which he made the following 
statements: 
I didn’t want this litigating track. The defendants insisted they wanted to file 
all these motions. I said, All right. . . .  
 
. . . . 
 
So, you know, all this discovery and depositions and whatever, and a trial, will 
accomplish zero. . . .83 
 
 . . . . 
 
 
 77 Id. at 9. 
 78 Erichson, supra note 73, at 1291. 
 79 Id. (emphasis added). 
 80 Order Regarding ARCOS Data, supra note 39, at 7. 
 81 Fisher, supra note 8. 
 82 Id. 
 83 Transcript of Status Conference Proceedings at 24–25, In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate 
Litig., MDL No. 2804 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 7, 2018), ECF No. 854 (emphasis added). 
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. . . I don’t want to be essentially encouraging the parties to spend all their 
efforts on this litigating track, because that . . . not only isn’t going to solve 
anything, I think it’s going to make resolution virtually impossible.84 
Judge Polster continued to advocate for a global settlement even as the first 
bellwether trial loomed. In an September 11, 2019 decision certifying a “novel” 
MDL “negotiation class,” he wrote: “From the outset of this MDL, the Court 
has encouraged the parties to settle the case. Settlement is important in any case. 
Here, a settlement is especially important as it would expedite relief to 
communities so they can better address this devastating national health crisis.”85 
Shortly thereafter, the distributor and retail pharmacy defendants moved Judge 
Polster to recuse himself from the MDL proceedings pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 455(a), relying on, among other things, his numerous judicial and extra-
judicial statements in support of a settlement and opposed to discovery and 
public trials.86 
However well-intentioned, the court’s anti-litigation, settlement-at-all-costs 
approach suffered at least two noteworthy flaws insofar as the public entity 
plaintiffs’ ARCOS disclosure request was concerned. First, the plaintiffs simply 
could not assess the potential culpability—if any—of each of the opioid 
defendants without the ARCOS opioid transaction data. As the district court 
ultimately acknowledged, the plaintiffs could not even ascertain which opioid 
manufacturers, distributors, and retailers they should name as defendants 
without the ARCOS transaction data.87 This is because there simply was no 
other way to determine which of those entities were in the chain of distribution 
of prescription opioids that ended up being dispensed in the public entity 
plaintiffs’ respective jurisdictions.88 The failure of the DEA to provide the 
plaintiffs with the ARCOS opioid transaction information precluded the 
plaintiffs from engaging in well-informed settlement negotiations and, 
therefore, potentially undermined the court’s objective of reaching a rapid, 
global settlement. 
Judge Polster’s initial refusal to disclose the ARCOS transaction data to the 
plaintiffs further indicates that he was persuaded by the defendants’ argument 
that the opioid MDL could be quickly settled so long as the plaintiffs had access 
to each defendant’s market share. While a market share approach might work in 
litigation involving defendants that manufacture near-fungible, health-harming 
 
 84 Id. at 29. 
 85 Memorandum Opinion Certifying Negotiation Class at 2, In re Nat’l Prescription 
Opiate Litig., MDL No. 2804 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 11, 2019), ECF No. 2590. 
 86 See Memorandum in Support of Motion to Disqualify Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) 
at 1–2, In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., MDL No. 2804 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 14, 2019), 
ECF No. 2603-1. 
 87 See Order Regarding ARCOS Data, supra note 39, at 6. 
 88 Id. at 6–7. 
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products like cigarettes,89 it is an inapt settlement model for the opioid MDL. 
Prescription opioids are not only legal, FDA-approved products, they are the 
best treatment modality for particular patients in certain circumstance.90 They 
are not per se defective, health-harming products like cigarettes. As a result, a 
market share-driven settlement could lead to inequitable outcomes by, for 
example, imposing a huge liability burden on a defendant with a large market 
share but relatively benign market behavior while permitting a defendant with a 
smaller market share that engaged in much more culpable conduct to free ride.  
More problematic, Judge Polster’s desire for a quick settlement was 
immaterial to any lawful assessment of the plaintiffs’ entitlement to the ARCOS 
transaction data. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45, which governed the 
plaintiffs’ ARCOS data subpoena, does not flinch where a federal judge or a 
party or even, as in the opioid MDL proceedings, a federal agency third-party 
subpoena target believes that nondisclosure of indisputably pertinent 
information would help secure a fast resolution to the litigation.91 Instead, and 
in line with Judge Polster’s order requiring the DEA to produce the ARCOS 
opioid transaction data, Rule 45 requires courts to order third-party data 
custodians to produce all relevant information sought by subpoena exclusive of 
trade secrets, privileged data, or other confidential commercial information.92 
In sum, the court’s eagerness to settle the litigation in no manner undermined 
the plaintiffs’ legal entitlement to relevant ARCOS information under the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
IV. MDL ARCOS PROCEEDINGS: PRODUCTION TO THE PUBLIC  
Soon after the DEA produced the ARCOS opioid transaction information to 
the MDL plaintiffs, HD Media Company, which owns the Charleston Gazette-
Mail, filed a West Virginia Freedom of Information Act request seeking the 
ARCOS transaction data from MDL plaintiff Cabell County, West Virginia.93 
 
 89 See generally Christopher Schroeder, The Multistate Settlement Agreement and the 
Problem of Social Regulation Beyond the Power of State Government, 31 SETON HALL L. 
REV. 612 (2001) (discussing key features of the Master Settlement Agreement reached 
between states and cigarette manufacturers in 1998); Frank Sloan & Lindsey Chepke, 
Litigation, Settlement, and the Public Welfare: Lessons from the Master Settlement 
Agreement, 17 WIDENER L. REV. 159 (2011) (discussing the structure and far-reaching 
effects of the Master Settlement Agreement reached between states and cigarette 
manufacturers in 1998). 
 90 See generally Deborah Dowell et al., CDC Guideline for Prescribing Opioids for 
Chronic Pain — United States, 2016, 65 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1 (2016) 
(recommending when to initiate or continue opioids for chronic pain outside of active cancer 
treatments, palliative care, and end-of-life care). 
 91 See FED. R. CIV. P. 45(d)(3). 
 92 Id. 
 93 United States of America’s Notice of Objections to Disclosure of ARCOS Data at 1, 
In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., MDL No. 2804 (N.D. Ohio June 11, 2018), ECF No. 
603. 
2019] OPIOID MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION SECRECY 677 
The Washington Post filed similar state public records requests directed at two 
Ohio county MDL plaintiffs.94 Consistent with the ARCOS protective order, the 
DEA and defendants were notified of those media requests and promptly 
objected to them on the same grounds that they had raised in opposition to the 
plaintiffs’ ARCOS subpoena.95 The DEA contended that, “While the United 
States understands the public interest in this case, the ARCOS data contains 
confidential commercial information about DEA registrants’ commercial 
activities, Privacy Act protected information, and Law Enforcement Sensitive 
Information.”96 Reflective of the level of secrecy that had infused the opioid 
MDL’s day-to-day proceedings since the court issued the ARCOS protective 
order, the DEA’s brief and affidavit in support of its objections to public 
disclosure of the ARCOS data—to which the media companies ultimately were 
required to respond—were so heavily redacted that they were difficult to 
evaluate on their merits.97 
In response to the DEA’s objections to their public records requests, the 
media companies intervened in the opioid MDL to petition the court to lift the 
ARCOS protective order and, thereby, provide the public access to the ARCOS 
opioid transaction data as well as the voluminous pleadings, motions, and other 
documents that had been filed under seal in the MDL pursuant to the protective 
order.98 The media companies maintained that Judge Polster had failed to make 
a good cause finding sufficient to support the ARCOS protective order,99 there 
existed a strong presumption in favor of open court records under longstanding 
precedent,100 the American public had a compelling interest in obtaining the 
information in the midst of a national public health emergency,101 and the 
public’s interest outweighed the DEA and defendants’ interest in secrecy.102 
The media companies also argued that the law enforcement and competitive 
harms alleged by the DEA and defendants were speculative and conclusory.103 
To bolster those claims, the media intervenors pointed out that neither the DEA 
nor the defendants could identify any harm attributable to detailed ARCOS 
 
 94 Id. 
 95 Id. at 1–2. 
 96 Id. at 2. 
 97 See generally United States of America’s Brief in Support of Objections to 
Disclosure of ARCOS Data, In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., MDL No. 2804 (N.D. 
Ohio June 25, 2018), ECF No. 663 (showing the redactions made to the brief). 
 98 Brief in Support of Disclosure of ARCOS Data Filed on Behalf of the Washington 
Post at 1–2, In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., MDL No. 2804 (N.D. Ohio July 9, 2018), 
ECF No. 718; HD Media Co., LLC’s Brief in Support of Public Disclosure of ARCOS Data 
at 1, In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., MDL No. 2804 (N.D. Ohio July 9, 2018), ECF 
No. 725. 
 99 Brief in Support of Disclosure of ARCOS Data Filed on Behalf of the Washington 
Post, supra note 98, at 8. 
 100 Id. at 4–5. 
 101 Id. at 9–10. 
 102 Id. at 1. 
 103 Id. at 11–13. 
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opioid transaction data released to the public by a West Virginia trial court in 
2016.104  
Judge Polster denied the media companies’ request to release the ARCOS 
information.105 Notwithstanding his earlier ruling rejecting the DEA and 
defendants’ objections to disclosure of the ARCOS transaction data to the public 
entity plaintiffs, Judge Polster concluded that the DEA and defendants had 
demonstrated good cause sufficient to justify the ARCOS data protective order 
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c)(1).106 In other words, the court flip-
flopped on its ARCOS-related good cause determination for a second time in 
the litigation.  
Cribbing directly from the DEA’s redacted brief in objection to ARCOS 
data production to the media companies, the court found that the information 
sought was “sensitive to pharmacies and distributors because it is confidential 
business information . . . and . . . sensitive from the DEA’s perspective because 
it is crucial to law enforcement efforts.”107 Notably absent from Judge Polster’s 
opinion denying the media companies access to the ARCOS data were his 
earlier admonitions that the DEA and defendants’ asserted interests carried no 
weight because, as he concluded, “market data over three years old carried no 
risk of competitive harm”108 and “it is untenable that exposure of the data will 
actually or meaningfully interfere with any ongoing enforcement 
proceeding.”109 
Judge Polster’s order also denied the media companies access to the 
ARCOS opioid transaction data on the theory that such disclosure would violate 
the federal Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).110 In so doing, he engaged in 
judicial jiu-jitsu to avoid the inconvenient fact that the media companies sought 
the ARCOS data not pursuant to federal FOIA but under pertinent state law, 
specifically, the Ohio and West Virginia public records statutes. As he 
explained: 
ARCOS data is not a record generated by the Counties that are, or may be, 
subject to state public records requests. It is a law-enforcement tool of the 
United States that it shares only with local law enforcement agencies to stem 
illicit drug-trafficking. Plaintiffs have gained the ARCOS data solely by virtue 
of the Court’s discovery processes. The data does not transmogrify into a 
 
 104 HD Media Co., LLC’s Brief in Support of Public Disclosure of ARCOS Data, supra 
note 98, at 6–7. 
 105 Opinion and Order at 12, In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., MDL No. 2804 (N.D. 
Ohio July 26, 2018), ECF No. 800. 
 106 Id. at 8. 
 107 Id. at 9–10. 
 108 Order Regarding ARCOS Data, supra note 39, at 17 (emphasis added). 
 109 Id. at 16. 
 110 Opinion and Order, supra note 105, at 10–11. 
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public record merely because it has been disclosed privately to the parties in 
this civil litigation.111 
This line of reasoning is difficult to defend on several counts. As already 
explained, the media companies did not request the ARCOS opioid transaction 
data from either the DEA or any other federal entity under federal FOIA. Rather, 
they sought the information from West Virginia and Ohio counties pursuant to 
those states’ public records laws. Those public records laws, in turn, make clear 
that the ARCOS information did transmogrify into state public records upon 
their receipt by the West Virginia and Ohio counties.112 
It is further worth pointing out that the DEA has been a proponent of the 
notion that otherwise private records transmogrify into documents to which it is 
entitled when those records are transferred from private parties to public 
custodians in federal civil litigation. For example, the DEA has taken the 
position on several occasions in federal district court that individual patients 
lose their privacy interests in their medical prescribing records when state law 
compels those records to be transferred by a dispensing pharmacy to a state 
prescription drug monitoring program (PDMP).113 According to the DEA, a 
retail pharmacy’s involuntary transfer of a patient’s prescribing records to the 
state PDMP database deprives that patient of standing to even object to the 
DEA’s warrantless access of the patient’s record.114 
The point here is a simple one. Record transmogrification is not a one-way 
doctrine. It cannot be the case that records do not transmogrify when such a 
result might defeat a federal agency or corporate defendant’s desire for secrecy 
but do so when it would benefit a federal agency at the expense of an 
individual’s privacy interests. The DEA’s position that individual patient 
prescribing records transmogrify once they are stored in state PDMP databases 
is not a random example. The DEA and opioid manufacturer and distributor 
defendants expressly advanced the argument in the opioid MDL that the public 
entity plaintiffs ought to be required to mine their own state PDMP databases—
rather than be granted access to the ARCOS opioid transaction data—in order 
to ascertain patterns of suspicious opioid sales and diversion.115 Needless to say, 
and unlike the ARCOS database, state PDMP databases do not include any 
 
 111 Id. at 11. 
 112 See OHIO REV. CODE § 149.43(A)(1) (2019) (“‘Public record’ means records kept by 
any public office, including, but not limited to, state, county, city, village, township, and 
school district units . . . .”); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 29B-1-2(4) (2015) (“‘Public record’ 
includes any writing containing information prepared or received by a public body, the 
content or context of which, judged either by content or context, relates to the conduct of the 
public’s business.”). 
 113 U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Utah Dep’t of Commerce, No. 2:16-cv-611-DN-DBP, 2017 
WL 3189868, at *8 (D. Utah July 27, 2017); Or. Prescription Drug Monitoring Program v. 
U.S. Drug Enf’t Admin., 998 F. Supp. 2d 957, 966–67 (D. Or. 2014), rev’d, 860 F.3d 1228 
(9th Cir. 2017).  
 114 See Or. Prescription Drug Monitoring Program, 998 F. Supp. 2d at 962–63. 
 115 Transcript of Feb. 26, 2018 Hearing, supra note 41, at 39–40. 
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opioid manufacturer and distributor transaction data. PDMPs track prescription 
opioid pills from the point of prescribing to the point of dispensing of the drug 
to the individual patient.116  
V. SIXTH CIRCUIT ARCOS PROCEEDINGS 
The media intervenors appealed the district court’s decision denying their 
request for the ARCOS opioid transaction data and myriad sealed or redacted 
opioid MDL documents to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth 
Circuit.117 The Sixth Circuit held that the district court’s determination that the 
DEA and defendants had shown “good cause” sufficient to prevent the Ohio and 
West Virginia counties from disclosing the ARCOS transaction data to the 
public constituted an abuse of discretion.118 The appellate court pointed out that 
“the best evidence that good cause did not exist for the Protective Order comes 
from the district court’s own balancing of the interests in disclosure versus 
nondisclosure” in its earlier order granting the public entity plaintiffs access to 
the ARCOS data.119  
The Sixth Circuit characterized Judge Polster’s “complete about-face 
concerning the relevant interests at stake” in the ARCOS data production 
disputes as “bizarre.”120 The appellate court found it incredible that the district 
court would anchor its denial of the media companies’ requests for ARCOS 
information in the very same speculative and conclusory grounds that the court 
had previously and vigorously rejected: the defendants’ and DEA’s purported 
commercial and law enforcement-related harms.121 Writing for the majority of 
a split panel, Judge Clay opined that the district court had gotten things right in 
its opinion ordering the DEA to disclose the ARCOS data to the public entity 
plaintiffs in the first instance because “representatives of the public . . . have a 
substantial interest in disclosure of the ARCOS data, while the DEA and 
Defendants have only a lesser interest in avoiding potential harms that can be 
avoided by narrower, less categorical means.”122 
The Sixth Circuit also questioned whether the district court was motivated 
to keep the ARCOS data secret so that it could deploy the possibility of future 
public disclosure as leverage in settlement discussions. The panel mused 
whether Judge Polster’s repeated statements in favor of a pre-trial settlement 
“suggest[ed] that at least part of the reason for the district court’s about-face on 
 
 116 See, e.g., Or. Prescription Drug Monitoring Program, 860 F.3d at 1232 (citing OR. 
REV. STAT. § 431A.860) (“[P]harmacies . . . are required to report electronically to the 
PDMP, among other things, the patient’s name, address, date of birth, and sex; the dispensing 
pharmacy’s identity; and the prescribing practitioner’s identity.”). 
 117 In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., 927 F.3d 919, 923 (6th Cir. 2019). 
 118 Id. at 931, 938. 
 119 Id. at 931. 
 120 Id. at 932–33. 
 121 Id. 
 122 Id. at 933. 
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what interests Defendants and the DEA have in nondisclosure of the ARCOS 
data might have been a desire to use the threat of publicly disclosing the data as 
a bargaining chip in settlement discussions.”123 With regard to that possibility, 
the panel delivered a stinging rebuke: “If this was a motivation for its holding, 
then the district court abused its discretion by considering an improper factor. 
And even if this was not part of the district court’s motivation, it appears that 
the court abused its discretion by acting irrationally.”124 
Another point of contention for the Sixth Circuit was the district court’s 
failure to take into account the relevant consequences that flowed from the 
aforementioned West Virginia trial court’s release of West Virginia ARCOS 
opioid transaction data in 2016.125 The media companies had argued in the 
district court that the aftermath of the West Virginia ARCOS disclosure favored 
public access to the MDL ARCOS opioid data because, while the release of the 
West Virginia information had provoked public and policymaker awareness 
about—and, for better or worse, action in response to—the opioid crisis, neither 
the DEA nor the defendants had suffered any harm.126 In fact, and as HD Media 
brought to the district court’s attention, the West Virginia distributor defendants 
neither sought a stay of nor appealed the West Virginia trial court’s decision to 
release the ARCOS data to the public.127  
The district court, of course, had not been moved by those arguments. It 
quickly disposed of the need to even evaluate the relative impacts of the release 
of the West Virginia ARCOS transaction information for two reasons. First, the 
court explained that the West Virginia request only sought to unseal second 
amended complaints, which are subject to a presumption of public access, and 
not data contained in discovery produced pursuant to a protective order, which 
are governed by the lower standard of good cause.128 In addition, the court 
contended that the West Virginia ARCOS disclosure was distinguishable from 
the media’s MDL ARCOS data request insofar as the distributor defendants in 
the West Virginia litigation only invoked competitive commercial harm in 
opposition to disclosure whereas, in the opioid MDL, the DEA “cites as a basis 
for nondisclosure, in addition to confidential commercial information, the need 
to protect law enforcement-sensitive information, which is a subject this Court 
takes very seriously.”129 
The Sixth Circuit was not impressed with the district court’s reasoning. It 
pointed out that public disclosure of the West Virginia “specific transactional 
data has proved extremely effective and consequential in calling attention to the 
horrors of the opioid crisis” by, for instance, inciting the United States House of 
 
 123 In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., 927 F.3d at 933. 
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 125 See id. at 933–34. 
 126 HD Media Co., LLC’s Brief in Support of Public Disclosure of ARCOS Data, supra 
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 127 Id. at 3. 
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Representatives Energy and Commerce Committee to investigate and issue a 
report about the crisis.130 As the record established, the Charleston Gazette-
Mail’s reporting based on the West Virginia ARCOS opioid transaction data 
“result[ed] in a Pulitzer Prize, a Congressional Committee report, and a broader 
public understanding of the scope, context, and causes of the opioid 
epidemic.”131 The panel also emphasized that the DEA’s inability to “point to 
any resulting harm [from the West Virginia ARCOS data disclosure] 
demonstrates that there is little chance of imminent harm from disclosure of the 
[MDL] ARCOS data.”132 The appellate court, therefore, concluded that the 
DEA’s alleged “law enforcement interests do not seem very weighty”133 and 
ordered the district court to reconsider the protective order: 
[T]he district court may entertain arguments by the DEA as to why particular 
pieces of ARCOS data that relate to specific ongoing investigations should not 
be disclosed; however, the district court shall not enter a blanket, wholesale 
ban on disclosure pursuant to state public records requests. Nor shall any 
modified protective order specify that the ARCOS data be destroyed or 
returned to the DEA at the conclusion of this litigation.134 
The Sixth Circuit went on to vacate all of the district court’s MDL orders 
that permitted numerous court records, including public entity plaintiff 
complaints, to be filed under seal or with redactions pursuant to the ARCOS 
protective order.135 The appellate court easily reached that result due to the 
significantly more robust right of public access that pertains to court records 
than that which applies to discovery produced pursuant to a protective order.136 
American constitutional and common law afford court records a strong 
presumption of openness, which the panel explained “applies here with extra 
strength given the paramount importance of the litigation’s subject matter.”137  
It is also well-settled that, given the public’s presumptive right to access 
court records, judges are proscribed from sealing court documents without 
espousing specific findings and conclusions to justify nondisclosure—even 
when no party objects to a request to seal.138 As a recent media investigative 
report into court secrecy explained, “In [Judge] Polster’s court, as lawyers began 
fleshing out their cases against the opioid industry in amended complaints, they 
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redacted details of the companies’ conduct. In almost every instance, Polster 
failed to provide on the record his reason for allowing the secrecy . . . .”139 
Judge Polster’s opinion denying the media companies’ requests for the 
ARCOS opioid transaction data similarly provided no such findings or 
conclusions in support of nondisclosure.140 “[T]he district court[, therefore,] 
ispo facto abused its discretion.”141 Consequently, the Sixth Circuit ordered 
Judge Polster to re-evaluate every one of the documents he had allowed to be 
filed redacted or under seal with the following guidance: 
The court is advised to bear in mind that the party seeking to file under seal 
must provide a “compelling reason” to do so and demonstrate that the seal is 
“narrowly tailored to serve that reason.” On remand, if the district court permits 
a pleading to be filed under seal or with redactions, it shall be incumbent upon 
the court to adequately explain “why the interests in support of nondisclosure 
are compelling, why the interests supporting access are less so, and why the 
seal itself is no broader than necessary.” In doing so, the district court is to pay 
special attention to this Court’s statement that “[o]nly the most compelling 
reasons can justify non-disclosure of judicial records.”142 
VI. THE IMPORTANCE OF TRANSPARENCY IN PUBLIC HEALTH LITIGATION 
“The judge is the primary representative of the public interest . . . . He 
may not rubber stamp a stipulation to seal the record.”143 
 
The Sixth Circuit’s ARCOS data opinion, which commanded the district 
court to conduct a lawful, public analysis of the competing arguments for and 
against public disclosure of the ARCOS opioid transaction information,144 was 
a victory for opioid MDL transparency. Judge Polster, in fact, reconsidered his 
decision to deny the media access to the ARCOS MDL information in toto and, 
in so doing, lifted the protective order as to the 2006-2012 ARCOS data.145 The 
Washington Post thereafter released a report about that data, which revealed that 
opioid manufacturers and distributors flooded the country with more than 76 
billion prescription opioid pills during the six-year period at issue.146 The report 
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contains a panoply of incredible statistics, including the fact that distributors and 
manufacturers sent 306 prescription pills per person per year to the tiny hamlet 
of Norton, Virginia.147  
While Judge Polster’s decision to release the 2006–2012 ARCOS data on 
remand was a welcome development in the opioid MDL, he has refused to 
revisit his decision not to release to the public more recent ARCOS information, 
industry suspicious order reports, and millions of other discovery documents 
and court records that remain sealed or redacted. As such, and for several 
reasons, the public should be concerned about the pervasive secrecy that has 
infected the litigation since its inception and continues to deny it, the real party 
in interest, access to critical health and safety evidence pertinent to the country’s 
drug use and overdose crisis. 
A. The Public Has a Compelling Interest in Transparent Health and 
Safety Litigation 
First, the public has a particularly compelling interest in transparency in the 
opioid MDL. The MDL represents public interest litigation in its purest form: 
its plaintiffs are taxpayer-funded public entities advocating in the federal courts 
on behalf of their constituents in an attempt to mitigate an ongoing national 
public health emergency.148 The public is not only footing the bill for the 
litigation, it is a direct party in interest to the proceedings. As the Washington 
Post aptly submitted to the Sixth Circuit, “This is not a ‘private’ dispute being 
litigated in public. Rather, it is a public dispute that is wrongly being litigated 
in private.”149 
The notion that the public has a fundamental interest in transparent court 
proceedings, of course, is neither a new nor novel concept even where, unlike 
in the opioid MDL, the public is not a direct party in interest to the proceedings. 
In fact, it is a longstanding, bedrock attribute of the Anglo-American justice 
system. “The roots of open trials reach back to the days before the Norman 
Conquest . . . in England,”150 which then “carried over into proceedings in 
colonial America.”151  
Over the years, American courts have waxed poetic about the public’s right 
to access the courts as well as the intrinsic purposes of that fundamental right. 
In 1894, the District of Columbia Circuit explained that “[a]ny attempt to 
maintain secrecy, as to the records of the court, would seem to be inconsistent 
with the common understanding of what belongs to a public court of record, to 
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which all persons have the right of access.”152 Nearly a century later, the United 
States Supreme Court formalized the public’s First and Fourteenth Amendment 
rights to open criminal trials in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 
expounding that “[t]he crucial prophylactic aspects of the administration of 
justice cannot function in the dark; no community catharsis can occur if justice 
is ‘done in a corner [or] in any covert manner.’”153 
Three years after Richmond Newspapers, the Sixth Circuit extended the 
holding and reasoning of that case to civil proceedings in Brown & Williamson 
Tobacco Corp. v. FTC.154 Much like the opioid MDL ARCOS data appeal, 
Brown & Williamson provided the Sixth Circuit with an opportunity to assess 
the public’s right to access important public health information that had been 
mired in secrecy in the district court.155 The decision was provoked by cigarette 
manufacturer Brown & Williamson Tobacco Company’s (B&W) appeal of the 
district court’s dismissal of its suit to enjoin the Federal Trade Commission 
(FTC) from publishing damaging information about some of its tobacco 
products in the Federal Register.156 Specifically, B&W sought to restrain the 
FTC from announcing that the agency’s cigarette testing methodology had 
underestimated the amount of tar in B&W’s Barclay cigarettes and the amount 
of both tar and nicotine in B&W’s Kool Ultra and Kool Ultra 100’s cigarettes.157  
The Public Citizen Health Research Group (Public Citizen) filed an amicus 
brief on appeal asking the Sixth Circuit to lift the blanket seal that the district 
court had placed on all documents filed by the FTC, which B&W vigorously 
opposed.158 The appellate court sided with Public Citizen, holding that the seal 
violated the public’s common law and First Amendment rights to access court 
proceedings.159 The court explained that, “In either the civil or the criminal 
courtroom, secrecy insulates the participants, masking impropriety, obscuring 
incompetence, and concealing corruption.”160  
Brown & Williamson held that the public was entitled to the FTC court 
records because “[t]he subject of this litigation potentially involves the health 
of citizens who have an interest in knowing the accurate ‘tar’ and nicotine 
content of the various brands of cigarettes on the market” and “how the 
government agency has responded to allegations of error in [its] testing 
program.”161 The Sixth Circuit wound up its opinion with a straightforward 
observation: “[C]ommon sense tells us that the greater the motivation a 
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corporation has to shield its operations, the greater the public’s need to 
know.”162 Not long after deciding Brown & Williamson, the Sixth Circuit 
extended the presumption of public access to pre-trial civil discovery.163 
If the public’s right of access to court proceedings is longstanding, has 
expanded in scope over time, and appears to be robustly guarded by the federal 
appellate courts, then why the fuss? The unfortunate reality, which the opioid 
MDL ARCOS data dispute brings into sharp contrast, is that trial courts are 
highly likely to seal documents, issue blanket protective orders, and permit 
parties to secretly litigate cases that implicate public health and safety. A recent 
Reuters investigative report targeting secrecy in mass tort litigation confirms 
this conclusion.164 Reuters’ analysis of Westlaw data from 3.2 million federal 
civil suits filed between 2006 and 2016 “revealed that judges allowed litigants 
to seal material in at least 65 percent of product-liability actions”165 and, “over 
the past 20 years, judges sealed evidence relevant to public health and safety in 
about half of the 115 biggest defective-product cases.”166  
Reuters further reported that, “[i]n 85 percent of the cases 
where . . . [public] health and safety information [was] under seal, judges 
provided no explanation for allowing the secrecy,”167 which is, as explained 
above, blatantly illegal. The judges that Reuters interviewed conceded that they 
issued blanket seals without cause in cases of great public import because they 
were swamped with litigation and such practice expedited case resolution.168 As 
former United States District Judge Jeremy Fogel explained: “You’re 
overburdened. You’ve got a limited bandwidth. You have lawyers fighting 
about everything. And so, when they finally agree on something, you’re all too 
happy to accept that . . . . [Therefore,] information that could have really made 
a difference sometimes doesn’t come to light.”169 
Retired West Virginia Trial Judge Booker T. Stephens similarly responded 
when asked why he had kept West Virginia ARCOS transaction data filed in the 
State’s case against OxyContin manufacturer Purdue Pharma under seal for 
twelve years before releasing it to the Charleston Gazette-Mail in 2016: “This 
case was sealed because both sides agreed and asked me to seal it.”170 He went 
on to say that, “Obviously[,] when you settle a case of this magnitude and of 
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this nature, Purdue Pharma would not want to let the world know they had 
engaged in deceptive marketing practices.”171  
Judge Stephens’s remarks are as concerning as they are candid. Federal law 
is clear that, while “[a] corporation very well may desire that the allegations 
lodged against it in the course of litigation be kept from public view to protect 
its corporate image, . . . the First Amendment right of access does not yield to 
such an interest.”172 The fuss, in sum, is about the rampant secrecy in mass tort 
public interest litigation notwithstanding the law, which demonstrates that even 
well-settled, fundamental public rights can suffer substantial erosion if not 
vigorously defended.  
B. Public Transparency Provides an Important Check on the Pro-
Secrecy and Pro-Settlement Forces that Drive MDLs 
Public disclosure also provides an important check on the incentives that 
promote secrecy and rapid settlements in general civil litigation, which are 
super-charged in mass tort MDLs like the aggregate opioid litigation.173 As the 
Sixth Circuit explained in Brown & Williamson: 
[P]ublic access provides a check on courts. Judges know that they will continue 
to be held responsible by the public for their rulings. Without access to the 
proceedings, the public cannot analyze and critique the reasoning of the court. 
The remedies or penalties imposed by the court will be more readily accepted, 
or corrected if erroneous, if the public has an opportunity to review the facts 
presented to the court. . . . [P]ublic access provides an element of 
accountability. One of the ways we minimize judicial error and misconduct is 
through public scrutiny and discussion.174 
To be fair, it is not just trial judges that forego transparency in order to move 
cases forward and secure more expeditious settlements in run-of-the-mill civil 
litigation. Private, contingency-fee-compensated plaintiffs’ attorneys, who want 
a quick return on their up-front investment rather than protracted proceedings 
and are required by the rules of ethics to place primacy on their clients’ interests, 
are incentivized to agree to secret proceedings and confidential settlements that 
may not be in the public’s interest.175 Corporate defense attorneys are also 
motivated to keep their clients’ wrongdoing shielded from public scrutiny and 
seek confidential settlement agreements to protect their clients’ reputations.176  
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Certain features unique to MDLs, however, hyper-incentivize judges, lead 
plaintiffs’ counsel, and defendants to collude to reach quick, confidential, global 
settlements that often operate to the plaintiffs’ disadvantage and keep the public 
in the dark.177 After highlighting the extravagant paucity of MDL cases that ever 
proceed to trial, which is, precisely, “very few,” Judge William Young aptly 
observed that “the ‘settlement culture’ for which the federal courts are so 
frequently criticized is nowhere more prevalent than in MDL practice.”178 It is 
particularly important, therefore, to demand and enforce public transparency to 
curb the MDL’s settlement-above-all-else priorities.  
Unlike class action litigation, which is governed by FRCP 23, the MDL 
process is subject to the 1968 Multidistrict Litigation Act.179 Pursuant to that 
statute, the Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court appoints a panel 
of seven federal judges that has the power to transfer groups of cases that are 
pending across various federal district courts and involve a common question of 
fact to a single federal district court.180 That “transferor” court then coordinates 
and conducts consolidated pre-trial proceedings.181 The Multidistrict Litigation 
Act mandates remand of transferred cases to the original “transferee” courts 
once the pretrial proceedings have concluded in the MDL transferor venue.182 
In order to manage their massive dockets and avoid resource-depleting, 
direct interaction with thousands of plaintiffs’ lawyers, MDL judges appoint a 
small group of attorneys as “lead counsel.”183 Lead counsel are responsible for 
the defining events in the litigation, including “negotiat[ing] settlements and 
dictat[ing] trial strategy.”184 As a result, the lawyers who have primary access 
to the MDL judge, decide the key litigation maneuvers, and negotiate 
exclusively with defense counsel are not the attorneys who represent the 
overwhelming majority of plaintiffs forced to litigate their claims in MDL 
venues and away from their home districts.185  
MDL judges appoint the same “repeat players” over and over again to MDL 
leadership positions purportedly due to their specialized aggregate litigation 
expertise.186 “Once appointed, lead lawyers highjack the cockpit and restrict 
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access to the judge.”187 Indeed, “some judges funnel all communications 
through their handpicked leaders.”188  
MDL judge-selected lead counsel, of course, do not work on behalf of the 
aggregate group of plaintiffs pro bono. Instead, judges award lead attorneys 
“common-benefit” fees for their efforts, which are funded by the MDL plaintiffs 
who have, at least in theory, “benefitted” from lead counsel’s work.189 Common 
benefit fees are a significant motivator for lead counsel, who control settlement 
negotiations, because those fees are often (1) hefty and well-eclipse contingency 
fees and (2) negotiated with defense counsel during settlement talks.190 As a 
result, the common-benefit fee arrangement often works to the advantage of lead 
counsel and the defendants at the expense of the MDL plaintiffs. As complex 
litigation expert and law professor Elizabeth Chamblee Burch has pointed out: 
“[B]y offering lead lawyers ‘“red-carpet treatment on fees” in return for 
favorable terms elsewhere,’ defendants can take advantage of lead attorneys’ 
control over settlement to strike deals that benefit the defendant and the 
plaintiffs’ leaders, but not the plaintiffs.”191 
Repeat player lead attorneys are also less likely to pursue litigation tactics 
that are disfavored by the MDL judge that appointed them, determines their 
common-benefit fee awards, and controls their potential future appointments to 
MDL leadership positions even when such tactics might not be in the plaintiffs’ 
best interests.192 Moreover, because contingency fee lead attorneys are heavily 
leveraged in up-front funding of MDL litigation, the longer MDL cases linger 
on the docket, the more likely lead attorneys are to suffer adverse financial 
consequences up to and including bankruptcy.193 Lead counsel, therefore, are 
dangerously incentivized to acquiesce to MDL judges that favor secrecy and 
rapid, global settlements at the expense of their clients’ and the public’s interest. 
MDL lead counsel and defense attorneys also are incentivized to reach a 
global, pre-trial settlement in order to circumvent the MDL procedure that 
requires that cases be remanded to their home districts for trial.194 Lead counsel 
seek to avoid remand because the transfer of the litigation back to home district 
courts deprives them of having their fees determined by the MDL judge that 
they have worked so hard to please over the course of the MDL pre-trial 
proceedings.195 Remand, instead, relegates control over lead counsel fees to any 
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number of independent home federal district court judges—none of whom lead 
counsel have had the exclusive opportunity to court during pre-trial 
proceedings.196  
Defense attorneys, on the other hand, disfavor remand because it requires 
them to either litigate against, or make piecemeal deals with, individual 
plaintiffs across the federal districts instead of resolving all of the cases against 
their clients once and for all in a global settlement.197 As Professor Burch points 
out, corporate clients strongly prefer the finality of a global settlement deal 
because it “reassures shareholders, puts [public relations] nightmares to rest, and 
returns focus to a company’s primary enterprise.”198 
Federal judges are also hyper-incentivized to push for expeditious 
settlements in MDL proceedings. The overwhelmingly majority of federal 
district court judges, 70%, want to be assigned an MDL, and 80% of those who 
have been assigned to one desire to be assigned to another.199 “Multidistrict 
litigations are plum judicial assignments; they involve interesting facts, media 
attention, and some of the nation’s most talented attorneys.”200 The federal 
panel that assigns MDLs rewards judges who resolve MDLs efficiently with 
additional MDL assignments and is unlikely to assign another MDL to a judge 
who failed to resolve a previous one quickly.201 Describing the pressure exerted 
on federal district court judges to rapidly resolve pending litigation, retired 
federal district court Judge Nancy Gertner wrote: 
Decry the “vanishing trial,” but do everything you can to end cases as quickly 
and summarily as possible. Value efficiency above all, which mean[s] 
encouraging the parties in a civil case to settle, or those in a criminal case to 
plead guilty. Confidential settlements were always good no matter what the 
issue; don’t look too deeply to see if the issues were fairly litigated. Any closing 
after all is as good as any other.202 
In sum and for the reasons provided above, a quick, global, confidential 
settlement is the endgame for most MDL judges, lead plaintiffs’ counsel, and 
defense attorneys. Because MDL transparency provides a public check on the 
aggregate litigation’s heightened perverse incentives, it is of paramount 
importance.  
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C. Transparent Discovery Is More Likely to Improve Public Health 
Policymaking than Secret Proceedings and Confidential Settlements 
The public also should advocate for transparent health and safety litigation 
because history teaches that it is the disclosure of health crisis provoking and 
exacerbating facts—and not the award of settlement funds—that drive 
meaningful public health reform. The 1990s tobacco litigation, which 
culminated in a massive global settlement, provides an illustrative example. 
Research demonstrates that few of the significant tobacco-related public health 
gains that have been realized in the United States since the 1998 tobacco 
settlement are attributable to the litigation’s enormous Master Settlement 
Agreement (MSA) payouts.203 This is because states devoted only a small 
fraction of those proceeds to tobacco-related public health issues.204 Instead, 
they diverted tobacco settlement money into their general funds and spent the 
vast majority of it closing budget gaps, keeping their Medicaid programs in the 
black, and supporting infrastructure projects.205  
Several tobacco-producing states actually expended their MSA tobacco 
settlement funds to subsidize the manufacture and marketing of tobacco.206 
North Carolina, for example, dedicated 75% of its MSA settlement proceeds to 
just such efforts.207 Worse yet, “a recent study showed that higher MSA 
payments were actually associated with weaker tobacco control measures; 
because a state’s share of MSA funds was dependent on the number of smokers 
in the state and its estimated tobacco-related Medicaid expenditures, the MSA 
did not necessarily discourage diversion of funds to other purposes.”208 
There is a consensus among experts, on the other hand, that the public 
disclosure of damning internal tobacco industry documents enhanced tobacco 
control policy and, thereby, improved public health outcomes.209 A group of 
public health scholars asked Judge Polster to take into consideration the 
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mistakes and successes of the tobacco litigation in devising a public health-
promoting opioid settlement in an MDL amici curiae brief. As they explained: 
[T]he [tobacco] MSA required tobacco companies to open, at their expense, a 
website which includes all documents produced in state and other smoking and 
health related lawsuits, maintain it for 12 years, and add all documents 
produced in future civil actions involving smoking and health cases. These 
documents have been cited to in Congressional hearings on tobacco regulation 
and in rulemaking, and created the dataset for a significant bibliography of 
scholarship, including nearly 800 journal articles and 29 full books, which has 
influenced public health policy for tobacco prevention and beyond.210 
In sum, “the implementation of transparency provisions [in the tobacco 
MSA]” “clearly had a positive effect on tobacco control” and, therefore, is 
“regarded as [a] public health success[.]”211 It is certainly difficult to imagine 
the achievement of this country’s positive tobacco-cessation-related public 
health outcomes had the damning tobacco industry documents produced in 
discovery been placed under seal into perpetuity. It is, likewise, difficult to 
imagine that an opioid litigation settlement devoid of any document disclosure 
mandate will have a meaningful impact on the country’s drug use and overdose 
crisis, regardless of the size of the ultimate payout. A group of American 
medicine and public health historians recently filed an amici curiae brief in the 
opioid MDL that emphasized this significant concern: 
[A]mici believe in the possibility of a successful settlement that could serve 
several critical interests of the public. Among these interests is access to 
information. The concealment of information about the abuse potential and 
distribution patterns of opioid painkillers allowed the opioid crisis to take root 
in the first place and to grow to its current dimensions. Since secrecy fueled 
the crisis, no just and genuinely remedial settlement can be reached unless it 
honors the public’s right to know and secures the conditions for its effective 
exercise into the future. As scholars, amici regard it as their mission to bring to 
light the largely hidden web of social and economic forces, corporate practices, 
cultural beliefs, and political decisions in which the victims of the crisis were 
trapped. . . . [A]mici . . . believe that a prospective settlement should take 
additional steps to guarantee full and permanent access to the records that will 
enable scholars and policymakers to develop evidence-based measures aimed 
at remedying the crisis in future years. A settlement exclusive of such 
provisions, amici fear, might entail yet another irreparable loss.212 
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D. Lack of Transparency in Cases Involving Ongoing Public Health and 
Safety Issues Can Kill 
Both history and common sense also teach that, in cases like the opioid 
MDL that involve an ongoing public health emergency, secrecy can exacerbate 
crises and put lives at risk. There are, unfortunately, more examples of such 
phenomena than this Article has the space to re-tell. But for just one such 
instance of public health and safety litigation secrecy leading to unnecessary 
deaths, generally, and the entirely preventable deaths of children, specifically, 
we need look no further than the Remington Model 700 rifle litigation. 
In the early 1990s, a plaintiff brought a personal injury case against gun 
manufacturer Remington Arms Company in the United States District Court for 
the District of Montana.213 The complaint alleged that a product defect in the 
firing mechanism of Remington’s popular 700-series bolt-action rifle caused the 
weapon to discharge without a trigger pull.214 The case, Aleksich v. Remington, 
settled in 1995 and was subsequently sealed in its entirety.215 
Richard Barber intervened in the Aleksich case on October 20, 2011 to 
petition the court to unseal the court records, contending that he, a member of 
the public, had a right to access the documents.216 Mr. Barber was on a very 
personal search for answers. “On October 23, 2000, [his] nine-year-old son, 
Richard Augustus ‘Gus’ Barber, was mortally wounded when the family’s 
Remington Model 700 rifle fired as his mother pushed the safety to the ‘off’ 
position in order to unload the gun.”217 At no time did Mrs. Barber touch the 
rifle’s trigger.218 As Mr. Barber’s heartbreaking investigation would reveal, 
numerous others, including several children, had been injured or killed by an 
unprovoked firing of a Remington 700 rifle and, in addition to the Aleksich case, 
several lawsuits had been filed well in advance of Gus’s death contending that 
the rifle’s firing mechanism was faulty.219  
During the fifteen years between the Aleksich settlement and Mr. Barber’s 
motion to unseal the Aleksich records, Remington refused to either recall the 
700 rifle or issue a safety warning about its firing mechanism.220 Instead, the 
company continued to manufacture the rifle.221 Mr. Barber, therefore, 
intervened in Aleksich to unseal the court records with the “hope that once the 
information in the . . . court file is made public, Remington will finally have no 
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choice but to issue an adequate safety warning, recall these fire controls from 
the market, and/or remove them from production altogether.”222 
The timing of Mr. Barber’s intervention was provoked by a CNBC 
documentary entitled Remington Under Fire: A CNBC Investigation, which 
premiered on October 20, 2010.223 Among other things, the documentary 
profiled the following documents that had been produced by Remington in the 
Aleksich case and sealed by the trial judge: 
• An internal memorandum from Remington’s lead engineer Mike 
Walker, dated December 3, 1946, warning of a “theoretical unsafe 
condition” involving the Model 700’s safety, which is the mechanism 
that is supposed to keep the gun from firing accidentally.  
• An internal memorandum from a Remington test engineer, dated April 
9, 1947, noting that the Model 700 could fire “by pushing the safety to 
the ‘off’ position,” which was “very dangerous from a safety and 
functional point of view.”  
• An internal memorandum from Mike Walker, dated August 16, 1948, 
where Walker proposed a change in his original design that would have 
incorporated a blocking device to keep the Model 700’s trigger 
mechanism from falling out of alignment.  
• A 1948 internal memorandum from Remington executives, noting that 
Walker’s proposed change to incorporate a blocking device “is the best 
design,” but concluding that “its disadvantages lay in the high 
expenditure required to make the conversion,” which—according to the 
same memorandum—would have been 5.5 cents per gun.  
• A memorandum from Remington’s patent attorney, dated August 31, 
1948, noting, “Our usual potential liability for the safety of our product 
is augmented somewhat by our knowledge that some Model 721 
safeties have misfunctioned [sic] . . . . However, our liability does not 
seem out of proportion to the advantage of retaining the 
present . . . construction, pending receipt of further complaints from the 
field.” 
• An internal memorandum from a Remington research manager, dated 
March 18, 1975, noting that Remington “could duplicate” the fire 
control problems on a Model 700 rifle that had been returned to the 
factory.224 
These documents, which the Aleksich court had sealed into perpetuity before 
Mr. Barber’s intervention, demonstrate that Remington knew that the Model 
700 rifle contained a faulty firing mechanism as early as the 1940s, that is, some 
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five-plus decades before the rifle claimed young Gus Barber’s life. Remington 
also was well-aware that replacing the faulty firing mechanism with the “best 
design” was entirely feasible but would cost 5.5 cents per rifle, and, therefore, 
simply refused to either warn the public about the potentially deadly design flaw 
or recall the weapon.225 The company’s response to the CNBC documentary 
was entirely disingenuous but predictable for a going concern that had grown 
comfortable with getting away with murder: “[T]he Model 700, including its 
trigger mechanism, has been free of any defect since it was first 
produced . . . .”226 
The stark reality is that countless individuals and children were needlessly 
wounded or killed by a product whose manufacturer knew was defective and 
potentially deadly for sixty-plus years. Equally concerning, the Montana Federal 
District Court went out of its way to ensure that the company could continue to 
cover up the Model 700 rifle defect by placing the entire litigation under seal 
indefinitely.227 During the fifteen years that the important public health and 
safety information produced by Remington in Aleksich remained under seal, of 
course, Mr. Barber’s young son, Gus, fell victim to court-ordered secrecy while 
Remington continued to manufacture the Model 700.228 As the above-discussed 
Reuters investigation into opioid litigation court secrecy concluded: 
The trail of hidden evidence running through the opioid crisis is emblematic of 
a pervasive and deadly secrecy that shrouds product-liability cases in U.S. 
courts, enabled by judges who routinely allow the makers of those products to 
keep information pertinent to public health and safety under wraps. And since 
nearly all such cases are resolved before trial, the evidence often remains secret 
indefinitely, robbing consumers of the chance to make informed choices and 
regulators of opportunities to improve safety.229 
E. Transparency in Complex Health and Safety Litigation Can Inform 
and Shift Sticky Narratives that Provoke Problematic Policymaking 
On a related note, transparency in complex, public health litigation, like the 
opioid MDL, can operate to shift sticky—but incomplete or inaccurate—public 
narratives regarding the causal forces of a health crisis and, thereby, provoke 
more thoughtful, evidence-based public health policymaking. Transparent 
discovery and trials, after all, promote “true and accurate fact finding.”230 As 
scholars have pointed out, the media, policymakers, and public have adopted an 
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overly simplistic narrative about the opioid crisis that the epidemiological data 
simply does not support.231 That popular narrative goes as follows: prescription 
opioid manufacturers flooded communities with their products and used 
deceptive marketing tactics to advance the belief that those products were not 
addictive; doctors, in turn, overprescribed prescription opioids, which led to 
massive diversion and rampant addiction and, ultimately, hundreds of thousands 
of entirely preventable prescription opioid overdose deaths.232 
This narrative not only animates the opioid MDL but has provoked the 
enactment of supply-side, law-enforcement-centric laws and policies, including 
the ubiquitous creation of prescription drug monitoring programs that the DEA 
and other law enforcement agencies routinely sweep through to crack-down on 
prescription opioid prescribers and so-called opioid overutilizers or “doctor 
shoppers.”233 The threat of criminal and administrative prosecution and its 
concomitant potential loss of livelihood has incentivized doctors to either force 
their opioid patients to quickly taper off the drugs, which is ineffective at 
treating narcotic dependency, or, worse, abandon those patients altogether.234 
Rapid, forced opioid tapering and patient abandonment motivated by vigorous 
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law enforcement monitoring, in turn, compelled many patients with a 
dependency on prescription opioids to substitute those FDA-regulated 
medications for unregulated—and much more powerful and dangerous—illicit 
substances, such as heroin and fentanyl, to avoid the crushing symptoms of 
“dopesickness,” which itself can be fatal.235 
This more complex narrative in no way implies that profit-driven 
prescription opioid manufacturers and distributors should be absolved of their 
significant contributions to the crisis. The West Virginia ARCOS opioid data 
that Judge Stephens eventually unsealed in 2016 certainly supports the claim 
that the opioid defendants flooded small, rural Appalachian towns with 
prescription opioids while the DEA sat on its hands.236 And as we now know, 
the national level ARCOS opioid transaction information, which the DEA and 
defendants went to great lengths to keep under wraps in the opioid MDL, 
indicates that the MDL pharmaceutical industry defendants engaged in similar 
behavior in communities across the country.237 
The point here is that the dominant narrative, which points the blame 
exclusively at the over-supply of prescription opioids and provoked 
policymakers to implement crackdown laws and regulations instead of an 
evidence-based harm reduction response, seems to have caused considerably 
more harm than good. Since the implementation of numerous supply-side 
crackdown tactics, including rampant PDMP surveillance, opioid prescribing 
has precipitously declined while opioid-related overdose deaths, the 
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overwhelming majority of which are attributable today to illicit substances—
and not prescription pills—has continued to climb.238 Patients with well-
documented, crippling pain conditions have been forced to suffer due to tapering 
and physician abandonment.239 And the opioid crisis is beginning to be eclipsed 
by the surge in other illicit drug-related deaths, including methamphetamine and 
cocaine, across the country.240  
The argument here is that, had the American public known the truth about 
the deceptive marketing practices of the opioid defendants and the addictive 
qualities of prescription opioids earlier in the crisis, policymakers might have 
been forced to respond to that information before the situation developed into a 
full-blown national health emergency. And perhaps policymakers would have 
been inclined to implement more thoughtful, evidence-based, public health-
promoting responses if they had had the opportunity to tackle the crisis before 
it spiraled out of control. It is possible, for instance, that transparency would 
have nudged the public to ask hard questions about the DEA’s role in the crisis 
and insist on controlled-substance-related agency reforms instead of 
immediately turning to the DEA and law enforcement for solutions. As it turns 
out, there is simply nothing like a well-hyped American controlled substance 
“emergency” that creates hysteria and provokes knee-jerk demands for a law-
enforcement-driven, supply-side crackdown on the culprit class of drugs 
accompanied by little concern for widespread collateral damage.  
VII. CONCLUSION 
As the opioid MDL and recent investigative reporting reveal, American 
health and safety litigation continues to be shrouded in secrecy to the public’s 
detriment and to the benefit of negligent regulators and profit-driven 
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corporations for no legitimate legal reason. The courts routinely, without cause, 
issue blanket protective orders and place key health and safety documents 
produced in litigation under seal into perpetuity in the name of efficiency and in 
violation of federal law. This Article contends that the public should be aware 
of—and concerned about—this ongoing travesty of justice beyond its sheer 
illegality. Among other things, it argues that the public has a compelling interest 
in transparent health and safety litigation, such transparency provides an 
important check to the perverse incentives that drive secrecy and confidential 
settlements in MDL proceedings, transparency is more likely to improve public 
health policymaking than secrecy and confidential settlements, nondisclosure of 
public health and safety information can exacerbate public health crises and risk 
lives, and transparency in public health litigation can help inform and shift the 
prevailing narrative about a public health crisis and, thereby, provoke more 
informed, evidence-based policymaking. 
It seems that Judge Polster was onto something when, in comparing the 
opioid crisis to a plague, he asserted that disclosure of the ARCOS data “is a 
reasonable step toward defeating the disease” because the information exposes 
“how and where the virus grew.”241 Hopefully, he takes his own advice 
seriously going forward in the opioid MDL and orders the disclosure of the 
millions of litigation documents and court records that remain secret, under seal, 
and/or redacted. Perhaps even more important, and as at least two amici curiae 
have argued, history makes clear that it is highly unlikely that an opioid MDL 
settlement will have any laudable impact on the country’s drug use and overdose 
crisis unless it mandates the disclosure and preservation of the litigation 
documents into perpetuity.242 The law requires the federal courts, after all, to 
place the public’s interest in transparency and public health over a corporate 
defendant’s or a government agency’s self-interested secrecy. 
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